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Abstract 
Security of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) has become a more sophisticated 
problem than security in other networks, due to the open nature and the lack of 
infrastructure of such networks. In this paper, the security challenges in intrusion 
detection and authentication are identified and the different types of attacks are 
discussed. We propose a two-phase detection procedure of nodes that are not 
authorized for specific services and nodes that have been compromised during their 
operation in MANET. The detection framework is enabled with the main operations of 
ad-hoc networking, which are found at the link and network layers. The proposed 
framework is based on zero knowledge techniques, which are presented through proofs.    
 
Keywords: mobile ad-hoc networks, authentication, intrusion detection, compromised 
nodes. 
 
1. Introduction 
An ad-hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not need to rely on a predefined 
infrastructure to keep the network connected. Nodes communicate amongst each other 
using wireless radios and operate by following a peer-to-peer network model. Such 
networks are also referred to as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) [5]. Unlike 
networks using dedicated nodes to support basic functions like packet forwarding, 
routing, and network management, in ad-hoc networks these functions are carried out by 
all available nodes [11]. Applications of mobile ad-hoc networks range from military 
tactical operations to civil rapid development such as emergency search-and-rescue 
missions, data collection/sensor networks, and instantaneous classroom/meeting room 
applications.  
 
The nature of the wireless and mobile environment makes it vulnerable to an 
adversary’s malicious attacks. Such networks are susceptible to attacks ranging from 
 -2- 
passive eavesdropping to active interfering. Unlike wired networks where an adversary 
must gain physical access to the network wires or pass though several lines of defense at 
firewalls and gateways, attacks on a wireless network can come from any direction and 
target all nodes. Therefore MANETs, do not have a clear line of defense, and every 
node must be prepared for encounters with an adversary directly or indirectly. 
 
In MANETs, nodes are receptive to being captured, compromised, and hijacked since 
they are units capable of roaming independently. Since tracking down mobile nodes is 
difficult to achieve, attacks by compromised nodes are far more damaging and much 
harder to detect. Therefore, nodes and network infrastructure must be prepared to 
operate in a non-trusting mode. Furthermore, the lack of a centralized authority gives 
ground to adversaries to exploit new types of attacks and break the required for efficient 
operations cooperative algorithms.  
 
In this paper, we propose a two-phase detection procedure of nodes that are not 
authorized for specific services and nodes that have been compromised during their 
operation in MANET. The detection framework is enabled with the main operations of 
ad-hoc networking, which are found at the link and network layers. The proposed 
framework is based on zero knowledge techniques, which are specifically designed to 
achieve node identification but do not rely on symmetric or asymmetric encryption 
algorithms, digital signatures, sequence numbers and timestamps. The zero knowledge 
techniques are presented through proofs.  
 
This paper is organized in the following five sections. Section 2 presents the types of 
attacks that exist in ad-hoc networks. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the challenges and related 
work in intrusion detection and present authentication models developed for ad-hoc 
networks. Section 5 describes the detection framework and discusses how unauthorized 
and compromised nodes are discovered. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper by 
presenting on areas that need further study.   
 
2. Attacks in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks  
Similar to other wireless networks, ad-hoc networks are susceptible to passive and 
active attacks [1]. Passive attacks typically involve only eavesdropping of data, whereas 
active attacks involve actions performed by adversaries such as replication, 
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modification and deletion of exchanged data. In particular, attacks in ad-hoc networks 
can cause congestion, propagate incorrect routing information, prevent services from 
working properly or shut them down completely [2, 8, 14, 17, 29, 30].  
 
Nodes that perform active attacks with the aim of damaging other nodes by causing 
network outage are considered to be malicious, also referred to as compromised, while 
nodes that just drop the packets they receive with the aim of saving battery life for their 
own communications are considered to be selfish [12, 14]. A selfish node affects the 
normal operation of the network by not participating in the routing protocols or by not 
forwarding packets. In addition, a compromised node may use the routing protocol to 
advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to 
intercept as in the so called black hole attack [19, 29]. 
 
Compromised nodes can interrupt the correct functioning of a routing protocol by 
modifying routing information and by fabricating false routing information. Recent 
research studies have also brought up a new type of attack that goes under the name of 
wormhole attack [26, 27]. In the latter, two compromised nodes create a tunnel (or 
wormhole) that is linked through a private connection and thus they by-pass the 
network. This allows a node to short-circuit the normal flow of routing messages 
creating a virtual vertex cut in the network that is controlled by the two attackers [13, 
15].  
 
On the other hand, selfish nodes can severely degrade network performance and 
eventually partition the network by simply not participating in the network operation. 
Compromised nodes can easily perform integrity attacks by altering protocol fields in 
order to subvert traffic, denying communication to legitimate nodes and compromising 
the integrity of routing computations in general. Spoofing is a special case of integrity 
attacks whereby a compromised node impersonates a legitimate one due to the lack of 
authentication in the current ad-hoc routing protocols [11, 20].  
 
The main result of a spoofing attack is the misrepresentation of the network topology 
that may cause network loops or partitioning. Lack of integrity and authentication in 
routing protocols creates fabrication attacks [3, 6, 22] that result in erroneous and bogus 
routing messages.  
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Denial of service (DoS) is another type of attack, in which the attacker injects a large 
amount of junk packets into the network. These packets overspend a significant portion 
of network resources, and introduce wireless channel contention and network contention 
in ad-hoc networks [4, 5]. In addition, the routing table overflow attack, where an 
attacker attempts to create routes to nonexistent nodes and the sleep deprivation attack, 
where an attacker tries to consume the batteries of a node, are two other types of DoS 
attacks [10]. 
 
3. Intrusion Detection Challenges  
When a set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or 
availability of a mobile node takes place, intrusion prevention techniques, such as 
encryption and authentication, are usually the first line of defense. However, intrusion 
prevention alone is not sufficient when systems become more complex and as security 
is often the after-thought. There are always weaknesses in the systems due to design and 
programming errors, or various “socially engineered” penetration techniques. 
 
For example, even though exploitable “buffer overflow” security holes, which can lead 
to an unauthorized root shell, were first reported many years ago they still exist in some 
recently released system software. Furthermore, as illustrated by the Distributed Denial-
of-Services (DDoS) attacks launched against major Internet sites where security 
measures were in place, the protocols and systems that are designed to provide services 
are inherently subject to attacks such as DDoS. Intrusion detection can be used as a 
second wall to protect network systems because once an intrusion is detected, a 
response must be put into place to minimize damages. 
 
By definition, intrusion detection involves capturing data and reasoning about the 
evidence in the data to determine whether the system is under attack [2, 19, 21, 22, 24, 
29]. The most important difference between fixed networks and MANETs is perhaps 
that the latter do not have a fixed infrastructure. Compared with wired networks where 
traffic monitoring is usually done at switches, routers and gateways in a network-based 
intrusion detection system (IDS), the mobile ad-hoc environment does not have such 
traffic concentration points and therefore can be categorized as host-based IDS.   
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While network-based IDS look at all the traffic in a network, host-based IDSs [19, 22, 
24] are concerned with what is happening on each individual node. They are able to 
detect actions such as repeated failed access attempts or changes to critical system files, 
and normally operate by accessing log files or monitoring real-time system usage. 
Furthermore, there may not be a clear separation between normalcy and anomaly in a 
mobile environment. A node that sends out false routing information could be the one 
that has been compromised, or merely the one that is temporarily out of sync due to 
volatile physical movement. 
 
There have been several studies on security detection measures for infrastructure based 
wireless networks, such as [2, 19, 22, 24, 29]. On the prevention side, general 
approaches such as key generation and management have been used in a distributed 
manner to ensure the authenticity and integrity of routing information [5, 7, 9, 30].  
 
Zhou and Haas [17] introduced a routing protocol-independent distributed key 
management service. This approach uses redundancies in the network topology to 
provide reliable key management. The main idea is to be able to use key sharing even 
with a maximum threshold ratio of compromised nodes to total nodes.  
 
The difficulties in realizing all these schemes are: first, cryptography is relatively 
expensive on mobile hosts, where computational capability is comparatively restricted; 
second, since there is no central authority that can be depended upon, authentication is 
more difficult to implement; third, these schemes are only useful to prevent intruders 
from outside (external attacks) and are not useful when an internal node is compromised 
(internal attack). Since authentication of mobile nodes is mainly achieved with the use 
of cryptographic techniques, it is essential to design efficient methods to achieve 
authenticity without the use of encryption algorithms, digital signatures etc. 
 
4. Authentication and Key Management Challenges 
Early authentication methods focused on connecting roaming mobile phone users to 
networks. The network needed to ensure that only valid users have access to its services 
and the users access a secure facility, as security lapses in a network can lead to 
permanent damage to a visiting user. The main aim was to establish a session key for 
confidential communication, mutual authentication and non repudiation [8, 16].  
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Most access control systems rely on public key management systems to certify an 
association between an identity and a key in the form of a digital certificate. These 
certificates contain the public key and the identity along with other details 
cryptographically signed by a trusted third party. Public key certificates employed by 
applications are created by Certificate Authorities (CAs). Security requirements for CAs 
are important with an exploration of the wide range of attacks that can be mounted 
against CAs [1, 4]. 
 
In conventional networks, the two main public-key management solutions are Pretty 
Good Privacy (PGP) and the X.509 public key infrastructure [1, 4]. PGP has an anarchic 
organization in contrast to the rigid hierarchy of X.509. In PGP there are some central 
certificate repositories that are not often used. In X.509 there is a hierarchy of CAs 
which are responsible for the issuing of certificates and their verification. A node 
verifies the authenticity of a certificate by using the public key of the CA.  
 
The CA may revoke a certificate and periodically release a Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) containing references to the revoked certificates. Delays in the release of a CRL 
may lead to the acceptance of some revoked certificates by nodes in the network. In ad-
hoc networks this approach is difficult to operate as access to a CA cannot be 
guaranteed at all times to obtain the latest CRL. In PGP a certificate’s trustworthiness is 
assigned by the user using it. The process to estimate the trustworthiness of a certificate 
may be prolonged and difficult in an ad-hoc network.  
 
The key management approaches for ad-hoc networks try to eliminate the need for a 
centralized CA. The first approach described in [17] emulates a conventional CA by 
distributing parts of the secret key on several nodes. A key management scheme has 
been proposed for ad-hoc networks using threshold cryptography and the public key 
paradigm. The scheme provides for distribution of parts of the secret key among some 
special ad-hoc nodes designated as servers. An attacker has to break into a threshold 
number of servers in order to get access to the secret key of the service. To prevent 
progressive compromise of servers share refreshing is done periodically. This scheme 
requires prior communications and coordination between the nodes for setting up the 
service. In addition, some nodes will have to work more than other nodes. Furthermore, 
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the requirement for each node to know the public key of all nodes is not feasible if the 
number of nodes in the ad-hoc network is large. 
 
In the second approach [23] each node authenticates the other by using some prefixed 
criteria, like the existence of a shared secret among the nodes in the ad-hoc network. 
Individual nodes in the network use the shared secret to generate their respective keys. 
One such scheme proposed by DeCleene [3] has a hierarchical framework. Each area in 
the hierarchy has a controller. These area controllers re-key a node when it moves 
between different “areas”. Another scheme proposed by Kong [12] uses the emulation 
of certification authority and shared secret model along with a Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) based centralized model. Initially the scheme has an aerial node acting as the 
centralized node for key distribution. If this aerial node is destroyed the scheme uses 
threshold cryptography based on secret sharing to emulate a distributed certification 
authority. 
 
In the last approach a self-organized public-key infrastructure is used. Hubaux [11] 
proposed a public-key distribution based trust building scheme for ad-hoc networks 
which is similar to the PGP web of trust concept. The scheme differs from PGP as there 
are no central certificate directories for distribution of certificates. Instead a user selects 
a subset of certificates from its repository to disclose to the other user. Both users then 
merge the received certificates with their own certificates. In order to find the public-
key of a remote user the local user makes use of the Hunter Algorithm on the merged 
certificate repository to build certificate chain(s). A certificate trust chain should lead 
from the local user certificate to the remote user’s certificate. The local user uses the 
public-key contained in the remote user’s certificate. 
 
The plurality of authentication and key management approaches (i.e. [25, 28]) enhance 
attacks that can target either the identity of a mobile node or the encryption key which is 
stored or exchanged via some cryptographic protocols. 
 
5 Detection Framework  
As mentioned in sections 3 and 4, the existing proposals in ad-hoc networks are either 
authentication or detection-oriented since they first identify current vulnerabilities and 
then enhance the existing protocol or propose a new protocol to challenge such threats. 
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Because the solutions are designed explicitly with certain attack models in mind, they 
work well in the presence of designated attacks but may collapse under newborn 
attacks. As illustrated in Figure 1, the detection framework we propose is related to the 
main operations of ad-hoc networking which are found at the link and network layers of 
the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (OSI). 
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Routing
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Data Packet
Transmission
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Valid Node
Unauthorized /
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Fig. 1 – Detection Framework 
 
The main operations related to ad-hoc networking are mainly taking place at the link 
layer with one-hop connectivity and frame transmission and at the network layer with 
routing and data packet forwarding [12, 14, 17]. Data link layer protocols maintain 
connectivity between neighboring nodes and ensure the correctness of frames 
transferred whereas routing protocols exchange routing data between nodes and 
maintain routing states at each node accordingly. Based on the routing states, data 
packets are forwarded by intermediate nodes along an established route to the 
destination.  
 
These operations comprise of link security and network security mechanisms that 
integrate a detection framework which consists of two phases. In phase-one the 
detection mechanism attempts to determine the true identity of the communicating 
nodes and thus detects unauthorized nodes through a non-interactive zero knowledge 
protocol. Likewise, in phase-two the detection mechanism determines whether the 
communicating nodes have been compromised or not through a non-interactive zero 
knowledge protocol.  
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5.1. Detecting Unauthorized Nodes (Phase-One) 
When one or more nodes are connected for the first time to a MANET, the detection 
procedure of an unauthorized node takes place. At this stage, it is necessary to be able to 
authenticate and thus determine the true identity of the nodes which could possibly gain 
access to specific applications or services in a MANET. This can be done by an 
authentication protocol which is suitable for MANETs.  
 
C
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B
X1
Authentication
& Key Agreement
Authentication &
Key Agreement
C
A
B
X1
Authentication
& Key Agreement
Authentication &
Key Agreement
X2
Authentication
& Key Agreement
Authentication &
Key Agreement
 
(a)                                                                                               (b) 
Fig. 2 – New Nodes in MANET 
 
Let us consider the MANET of Figure 2 with the authenticated nodes A, B, and C. As 
illustrated in Figure 2(a), when node X1 enters the MANET, it will be authenticated by 
neighboring nodes B and C. When two nodes, e.g. nodes X1 and X2, enter the MANET, 
they will both be authenticated by neighboring nodes because new routes between nodes 
will be created as shown in Figure 2(b). For example, node X1 gets authenticated by the 
closest nodes B and C, making node X1 a valid node. Similarly, upon entrance of node 
X2, the closest nodes B and X1 will authenticate node X2 (Figure 2b). Once nodes X1 
and X2 have been authenticated by valid nodes, they will also authenticate each other 
since routing and packet forwarding data will be sent to or received by them. 
 
There are several authentication protocols available in the literature that can be applied 
to MANETs. However, it is necessary to use non-interactive and low complexity 
protocols that will not create extra computational overhead in the network. For example, 
a provably secure authentication scheme can be considered as a “good” candidate in 
phase-one. Such a scheme is preferable to a computationally secure authentication 
scheme because its security relies on the apparent intractability of a well known 
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computational problem (i.e. discrete logarithm problem) and does not necessarily 
require the use of a symmetric or an asymmetric encryption algorithm. Therefore, 
authentication can be achieved with a zero knowledge protocol, similar to the protocol 
described in [18] that provides such characteristics.    
 
The basic concept behind the use of such cryptographic protocols is that they allow a 
claimant, a node in a MANET context, to demonstrate knowledge of a secret while 
revealing no information whatsoever of use to the verifying node even if the claimant 
node misbehaves. In such protocols, nodes must exchange multiple messages, also 
referred to as interactive, where the proof is probabilistic rather than absolute. However, 
interactive zero protocols are not suitable for wireless environments since they 
exchange multiple messages and result in the reduction of network performance. 
MANETs are suitable for non-interactive zero knowledge protocols where nodes do not 
need to exchange multiple messages to prove their identity. 
 
In Figure 2 (a) for example, node X1 can prove its identity to nodes B and C ensuring 
that the discrete logarithms 111
xy α=  and 222 xy α=  to the bases 21,αα , satisfy Equation 
1; 
 ( )pbxkxk mod2211 =⋅+⋅   (1) 
for integers 1k , 2k , and prime number p [18]. 
 
In the protocol, node X1 first computes 333
xy α=  and 444 xy α=  then solves Equation 2, 
for integers 43, xx :  ( )pxkxk mod04231 =⋅+⋅  (2) 
 
Next, the following message exchange takes place: 
B, C ← X1 : 315 xy α= , 426 xy α=      (M1) 
B, C → X1 : ( )652121217 ,,,,,,,, yybkkyyHy αα=    (M2) 
B, C ← X1 : ( )pxyxy mod1738 ⋅−= , ( )pxyxy mod2749 ⋅−=   (M3) 
 
Node X1 sends 5y  and 6y
 
to nodes B and C. Upon reception of message (M1), nodes B 
and C compute 7y  with a one-way hash function and send message (M2) to node X1. 
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Next, node X1 checks the validity of (M1), constructs message (M3) and sends 8y , 9y  
to nodes B and C.  
 
Node X1 convinces nodes B and C that he/she knows the discrete algorithms of 1y  and 
2y  to the bases 1α  and 2α  respectively, and that these logarithms satisfy a linear 
equation. This can be done by verifying the resulting proof ),,( 987 yyy . It can be easily 
seen that nodes B and C will always succeed in constructing a valid proof by first 
reconstructing 78 1110
yy yy ⋅=α
 
and 79 2211
yy yy ⋅=α , then checking whether 7y  is equal to 
12y , for ( ) 121110212121 ,,,,,,,, yyybkkyyH =αα , and if Equation 3 is valid:   ( )pbyykyk mod79281 ⋅−=⋅+⋅  (3) 
 
First, it can be easily seen that nodes B and C will always succeed in constructing a 
valid proof since 510 yy =  and 611 yy =  
5111
,
1110
371173
18
78 yyy xyxxyx
yy
yy ==⋅=⋅= ⋅⋅− αααα  
6222
,
2211
472274
29
79 yyy xyxxyx
yy
yy ==⋅=⋅= ⋅⋅− αααα . 
Thus,  ( ) ( ) 765212121111021212112 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, yyybkkyyHyybkkyyHy === αααα  
 
Hence, nodes B and C calculate 12y  and compare it with 7y  in message M2.  
 
Second, assume that an intruder E who does not know 1x  and 2x  was able to compute 
such proofs. Since the one-way hash function 7y  is hard to invert, we can assume that 
the values 10y  and 11y  were fixed before 7y  in message M2 was computed. It also 
seems necessary that when fixing the values 10y  and 11y , B and C were prepared to 
compute a proof for many other possible messages. But this means that E could also 
compute different representations of 10y  and 11y  to the bases 1α , 1y  and 2α , 2y  which 
implies the knowledge of 1x  and 2x , the discrete logarithms 1y , 2y  to the bases 1α , 2α , 
but this contradicts the assumption that the cheating E does not know 1x  and 2x .  
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Furthermore, nodes B and C verify whether the responses 8y  and 9y  satisfy Equation 3. 
Thus, ( ) ( )
( )( )pby xkxkyxkxk
xykxkxykxk
xyxkxyxkykyk
Eq
yy
mod7
2,1.
221174231
2724217131
27421731
,
9281
98
⋅−=
⋅+⋅⋅−⋅+⋅= ⋅⋅−⋅+⋅⋅−⋅=
⋅−⋅+⋅−⋅=+
 
and validate the identity of node X1. The successful authentication of node X1 concludes 
that the particular node is authorized to specific applications which are carried out in the 
MANET.  
 
5.2. Detecting Compromised Nodes (Phase-Two) 
When routing information and/or data packets are ready to be transferred, phase-two 
takes place. The detection procedure for compromised nodes carries on in the available 
nodes starting with one-hop at a time from the source to destination route. Due to the 
node mobility in ad hoc networks, the route from the source to destination node is 
subject to change. However, the detection procedure is independent to the mobility of 
nodes since the routing protocol is responsible for delivering data to nodes. The 
detection process, followed in phase-two, requires the true identity and compromised 
status of the communicating nodes. Hence, nodes are authenticated with a zero-
knowledge protocol and the compromised status is determined by a local agent that 
collects and analyses audit data.  
 
The agent, which is embedded to all nodes, knows the user’s standard profile, records 
deviations from this reference and is also familiar with the signatures of known attacks. 
Even though the agent operations are similar to IDS, the agent has a passive role of 
gathering and analyzing audit data locally and passing a confidence interval to the 
neighboring node for further process. The agent can collect and analyze data at regular 
intervals or provide a continuous service for open environments. Data manipulation 
determines node identification and compromised status procedure.   
 
5.2.1 Node Identification & Compromised Status Procedure 
Let us assume that X1 was authenticated when it entered the MANET of Figure 2a with 
the zero knowledge protocol of section 5.1. Similar to section 5.1, when routing 
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information is ready to be transferred, node X1 should prove again its identity and 
compromised status to nodes B and C ensuring that the discrete logarithms, 
),(
11
211 zzfxy +=α  and ),(22 212 zzfxy +=α  to the bases 21,αα , satisfy Equation 4: 
 ( )pbzzfxkxk mod),( 212211 +=⋅+⋅   (4) 
for integers 1k , 2k , b and prime number p [18].  
 
Notice that Equation 4 contains a multivariable function ),( 21 zzf  that determines the 
compromised status of a node. Such function is defined in Equation 5:  
 ≤≤=⋅+⋅= otherwise,0 ,for,mod),( 2211221121 xzzxpczkzkzzf  (5) 
for integers 1k , 2k , and prime number p.  
  
The value of ),( 21 zzf  is determined by the local agent. Based on the analysis of data 
the agent defines a confidence interval where a node is considered to be compromised. 
The confidence interval can follow a normal distribution as shown in Figure 3. Even 
though the values of 1x  and 2x  are discrete, the interval is continuous.  
 
 
Fig. 3 – Confidence Interval for Compromised Nodes 
 
If the values of 1z  and 2z , which are assigned by the local agent, are found within the 
interval of 1x  and 2x , then ),( 21 zzf  is defined as pczkzkzzf mod),( 221121 =⋅+⋅= . 
Next, node X1 proves its valid identity to nodes B and C and routing information is 
exchanged. On the contrary, if the values of 1z  and 2z  exceed the interval from 1x  to 
2x , then 0),( 21 =zzf . Hence, Equations 1 and 4 are the same. In such a circumstance, 
node X1 is considered to be compromised because it proves its identity to nodes B and 
x2  x1 
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C with the procedure mentioned in section 5.1. Therefore, routing information will be 
considered unreliable and will be discarded by the neighboring nodes B and C.  
 
5.2.2 Validation Procedure 
In the validation procedure, node X1 computes 333
xy α=  and 444 xy α=  and then solves 
Equation 2, for integers 43, xx . Following, exchange of messages takes place afterwards: 
B, C ← X1 : 315 xy α= , 426 xy α=      (M1) 
B, C → X1 : ( )65212121217 ,,),(,,,,,,, yybzzfckkyyHy += αα  (M2) 
B, C ← X1 : ( ) ( )pxzzfyxy mod),( 121738 +⋅−= ,  
          ( ) ( )pxzzfyxy mod),( 221749 +⋅−=     (M3) 
 
Node X1 sends 5y  and 6y
 
to nodes B and C. Upon reception of message M1, nodes B 
and C compute 7y  with an one-way hash function and send message M2 to node X1. 
Next, node X1 checks the validity of M1, constructs message M3 and sends 8y , 9y  to 
nodes B and C.  
 
Node X1 convinces nodes B and C that he/she knows the discrete algorithms of 1y  and 
2y  to the bases 1α  and 2α , respectively, and that these logarithms satisfy a linear 
equation. This can be done by verifying the resulting proof ),,( 987 yyy . It can be easily 
seen that nodes B and C will always succeed in constructing a valid proof by first 
reconstructing 78 1110
yy yy ⋅=α , 79 2211 yy yy ⋅=α  and then checking whether 7y  is equal to 
12y , for ( ) 121110212121 ,,,,,,,,, yyybckkyyH =αα  and if Equation 6 is valid:    
  ( ) ( )pbzzfyykyk mod),( 2179281 +⋅−=⋅+⋅  (6) 
for ( )pzzfkzzfk mod0),(),( 212211 =⋅+⋅ . (7) 
 
First, it can be easily seen that nodes B and C will always succeed in constructing a 
valid proof since 510 yy =  and 611 yy = : 
51
)),((
1
)),((
1
,
1110
3121712173
18
78 yyy xxzzfyxzzfyx
yy
yy ==⋅=⋅= +⋅+⋅− αααα  
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62
)),((
2
)),((
2
,
2211
4221722174
29
79 yyy xxzzfyxzzfyx
yy
yy ==⋅=⋅= +⋅+⋅− αααα . 
Then,  ( ) ( ) 765212121111021212112 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, yyybckkyyHyybckkyyHy === αααα . 
 
Hence, nodes B and C calculate 12y  and compare it with 7y  in message M2. 
Furthermore, nodes B and C verify whether the responses 8y  and 9y , satisfy Equation 
6. Thus, ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ).mod),( ),(),(
),(),(
)),(()),((
217
7,4,2.
2122117221174231
272217242171217131
221742121731
,
9281
98
pbzzfy
zzfkzzfkyxkxkyxkxk
xykzzfykxkxykzzfykxk
xzzfyxkxzzfyxkykyk
Eq
yy
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Nodes B and C will accept the routing information which is coming from node X1 since 
there is a high confidence that it has not been compromised during its operation in 
MANET. As a result, the communicating nodes are eligible to agree upon a secret key, 
which will encrypt the actual communication.  
 
6 Conclusions 
Security of MANET has become a more sophisticated problem than security in other 
networks due to the open nature and lack of infrastructure of ad-hoc networks. Current 
research efforts on ad-hoc networks follow a hierarchical approach, where the most 
explored area involves secure routing protocols. Authentication and intrusion detection 
mechanisms, on the other side, are explored less than routing protocols. In this paper we 
explored the authentication and intrusion detection challenges and proposed a detection 
mechanism for unauthorized and compromised nodes.  
 
Since mobile ad-hoc networks can be formed, merged together or partitioned into 
separate networks on the fly, it is essential to be able to determine the identity of the 
nodes participating in such networks. It is also necessary to be able to verify whether a 
node has been compromised or not during the operation of a MANET. The proposed 
detection mechanism, which is enabled with the main operations of link and network 
layers, makes use of local agents that collect and analyze audit data. Each agent assigns 
a compromised status based on his data analysis and passes it to the neighbouring nodes 
for further decisions.  
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Nodes apply zero knowledge techniques to exchange information and therefore, identify 
unauthorized and compromised nodes. Our protocols allows a proof of the truth of an 
assertion, while conveying no information whatsoever about the assertion itself other 
than its actual truth. The authentication schemes applied in MANETs usually 
demonstrate knowledge of a secret in a time-variant manner which might nonetheless 
reveal some partial information about the secret key. Nevertheless, once the 
authentication infrastructure is in place, data confidentiality and integrity issues can be 
tackled by using existing and efficient symmetric algorithms since there is no need of 
developing any special integrity and encryption algorithms for ad-hoc networks.    
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